This article studies the Sage Ibn Rushd (Averroes)’s affirmation of the argument of Potentiality and Necessity, an affirmation that has been classified by some sages to be among the affirmations of the Argument of Potentiality and Necessity, while ignoring Ibn Rushds critique of Ibn Sina(Avicenna)s affirmation the same argument. As for those, who have studied Ibn Rushd’s philosophy, they consider him as one the critics of the Argument of Potentiality and Necessity for his critique to Ibn Sina’s affirmation, while ignoring his own affirmation of the argument. The ambiguous question is how to reconcile between these two matters, especially with noting that some of his critiques to Ibn Sinas affirmation of the argument are strange to the way and principles that the sage follow in this concern. The purpose of this article is to give a new perusal of Ibn Rushds affirmation of the Argument. It is a comprehensive perusal of his criticism, as well as his own affirmation, putting his rgument among the argument of theologians, known as the argument of potentiality of attributes, not the argument of the sage. The study also aims at opening the door to new studies for understanding some similar arguments in Western philosophy, such as the argument of Thomas Aquinas and others. In this perusal we have studied many other evidences and delved into many studies of Ibn Rushd’s philosophy.