Dr. Salih al-Wa'ili examines Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's criticisms of the Aristotelian principle-"The contingent is neither majoritarian nor permanent"-across three main points, defending the Aristotelian school: 1- The Problematic of Unknown Quantity (Numerical Anonymity): This concerns the quantity required to define the boundaries of the principle. Dr. Al-Wa'ili addresses this by considering the states (or cases) of nature in induction, rather than its individuals, arguing that these states are often limited. Thus, the majoritarian element is achieved when exceeding half of the total cases, eliminating the anonymity. He distinguishes between induction, defined as surveying individuals, and experience, defined as surveying the cases encompassing the principle. 2- The Analysis of Contingency: He analyzes the contingent as that which is not necessitated by the nature of the subject but arises from an accident (or external factor). What is contingent is minoritarian in occurrence. He highlights the rationality and necessity of the principle, rejecting Al-Sadr's account, which traced contingency back to an unspecified general knowledge. 3- The Gap of Generalization: Using the previous two points, he counters Al-Sadr's objections, paving the way for the objective justification of generalization. He objects to the alternative treatment based on the accumulation of probabilities, followed by resorting to the postulate of "the design of human knowledge" to transition from high confirmation to certainty. He questions: Why do we neglect the opposing probability on the other axis whenever probabilities accumulate on one axis? He concludes that the only answer is belief in the Aristotelian principle in its rational essence. The research concluded that what is considered valid in induction are the individuals of nature, not its cases, because the latter does not reflect the intention of the Aristotelians nor does it resolve the problem of anonymity. Furthermore, Dr. Al-Wa'ili's account of the contingent and the transition to minoritarian occurrence is an unsupported inference, lacking a necessary connection. It also concluded that any account of the contingent ultimately leads to general knowledge due to its lack of specific formulation, and that Al-Sadr's attempt to justify generalization is more coherent and grants rational certainty (Yaqin 'Uqala'i), unlike the Aristotelian principle, which demands a strict certainty that its premises cannot fulfill.