This study examines the problem of infinite regress in the principles of voluntary action. Classical interpretations that define voluntary actions as being preceded by will lead either to an impossible regress or to the negation of choice altogether. The study adopts a critical-analytical method to review traditional models, particularly those raised in the philosophy of Mirdamad and the school of Transcendent Philosophy (al-Hikma al-Muta'aliya), tracing the roots of the problem to the absence of a distinction between "the graded levels of the human soul's agency". The originality and novelty of this study lie in the following: First, it criticizes and moves beyond reductionist approaches that confine the debate to "will" alone, affirming that the problem extends to all principles of voluntary action-thus rendering partial solutions incapable of grasping the full scope of the issue. Second, it offers an ontological treatment through "the graded agency of the human soul", replacing the model of sequential generation with a philosophical framework that treats voluntary actions as graded manifestations and effects revealing the multiple levels of the soul's agency. Third, the study reconstructs traditional solutions and classifies them according to this coherent vision, thereby moving beyond certain conventional solutions in Yamani Philosophy (al-Hikma al-Yamaniya) and certain verbal disputes in Transcendent Philosophy, and establishing a consistent epistemological criterion for addressing the problem of regress. Fourth, it re-reads certain traditional solutions, placing them in their proper context and linking them back to the chosen solution. The study concludes that the root of the problem lies in treating the actions embedded within these principles as "intentional acts" that require prior cognitive and propensive mediations of the same kind, thereby generating an infinite regress. The true criterion of voluntary action, however, is that it proceeds from the agent through effective knowledge and consent; it does not require the prior existence of volitional principles. Accordingly, the study rejects the assumption that such a chain of principles is necessary, establishing instead that choice is a fundamental ontological reality, rather than the result of an accumulated sequence of actions of willing.