The study of the propositions of Practical Reason is beneficial for several cognitive fields, such as Usul al-Fiqh (Principles of Jurisprudence), Practical Wisdom, and the philosophies of human sciences. Before embarking on the presentation of a new theory in this domain, the researcher must review and analyze previous intellectual efforts, either to continue the path with minor or fundamental modifications, or to deviate entirely from the traditional trajectory. Within this framework, this article seeks to present Shaykh Mesbah's view regarding the nature, foundations, and implications of the propositions of Practical Reason by analyzing the texts disseminated throughout his works, utilizing a rational methodology to review potential critical observations concerning this perspective. The study concluded that his propositions of Practical Reason are descriptive (khabariyya) propositions, as they report the real relationship between action and end (goal), following the philosophical concept of necessity by comparison (al-dharura bil-qiyas). Their principles, however, rely on certain (yaqiniyya) propositions, whether they are self-evident (axiomatic) or theoretical. Human reason may sometimes be unable to prove specific particulars of the propositions of Practical Reason due to the complexity of factors and variables, compelling it to resort to Revelation as a complementary epistemic source. Thus, Revelation becomes one of the sources for these propositions. Regarding the implications of these propositions, the research addressed the following results: 1- The demonstrative nature (Burhaniyya) of the propositions of Practical Reason. 2- The quality of being true or false (veracity) in the propositions of Practical Reason. 3- Practical-reason propositions in themselves (nafs amr) are anchored in external states of affairs.  4-The existence of a relationship between the propositions of Practical Reason and reality. 5- The inference based on the propositions of Practical Reason is the demonstrative syllogism (Qiyas Burhani). 6- The existence of an inferential relationship between "what ought to be" (ma yanbaghi) and "what is" (ma huwa ka'in). 7- Ethical realism. 8- The permanence of the propositions of Practical Reason and the non-relativity of ethics.